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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. HURT, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANCIS 0. HURT, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO: 890142-CA 
PRIORITY: 14b 
An Appeal from a Judgment of the First 
Judicial District Court of 
Box Elder County, State of Utah 
Honorable Gordon J. Low, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article VIII, 
Section 1, et. seq. , and the Judicial Code of Utah Code 
Annotated, in particular § 78-2a-3 entitled "Court of 
Appeals Jurisdiction", which states as follows: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellant 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h) Appeals from District Court 
involving domestic relations cases, 
including but not limited to divorce, 
annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption 
and paternity;... 
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This appeal is from the District Court of Box Elder 
County and involves a domestic relations case concerning 
paternity, divorce and other issues delineated in the Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) , therefore, this Court has 
appellant jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an action wherein the Plaintiff/Respondent, who 
is the wife, brought an action for divorce against the 
husband, who is the Defendant/Appellant, in the First 
Judicial District Court of Box Elder County, wherein ulti-
mately a Decree of Divorce was granted to the parties with a 
division of the marital property, a determination as to 
paternity and an award of child support. The issues essen-
tially evolve around a denial of an equity award in the 
marital home, an alleged excessive award of child support 
and a finding of paternity in the Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented by this appeal as presented by the 
Appellant in his brief are as follows: 
1. Did the Trial Court err in admitting blood tests 
into evidence on the issue of paternity where other blood 
tests had come to a different conclusion? 
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2. Did the Trial Court err in determining that the 
Appellant was the father of the child despite conflicting 
evidence? 
3. Did the Trial Court err in awarding back child 
support at a time when it was without jurisdiction to do so 
under Utah law? 
4. Did the Trial Court err in failing to make proper 
findings of fact established under Utah case law before it 
awarded child support? 
5. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and award 
excessive child support under circumstances where the 
Appellant!s income was not properly calculated? 
6. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in making 
a property distribution that failed to take into account the 
fact that the Appellant had $5,000.00 worth of equity in the 
family home? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant and the Respondent were married on the 
15th day of October, 1983, in Willard, Utah. (See Tran-
script p. 34 hereinafter referred to as Trans.) 
Prior to their marriage, the Appellant and Respondent 
had lived together and had sexual relationships resulting in 
the birth of a minor child by the name of Kathy Jo Heyden 
which child was never adopted by the Appellant nor given the 
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Appellant's last name and who was born February 12, 1976. 
(See Trans, p. 35) 
An action was originally commenced in the Salt Lake 
County District Court by the Utah State Attorney General's 
Office in regards to establishing paternity in the Appellant 
on behalf of the Respondent which was ultimately dismissed 
without prejudice on the 22nd day of August, 1980, without a 
determination as to paternity. (See Trans, p. 36, 37, and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #4). 
That the parties acquired certain real property and a 
home during their marriage for a purchase price of 
$59,500.00 which the Respondent lived in for approximately 
two to three weeks after the parties separation of August 4, 
1987. (See Trans, p. 62 & 67). The home was foreclosed for 
failure to make payments with the Appellant receiving a 
Notice of Foreclosure sometime in January, 1988. (See 
Trans, p. 63). The Respondent moved out of the marital home 
on October 15, 1987, informing the Appellant that the 
Respondent could no longer make the house payments and he 
could move back into the home and that the home was to be 
listed for sale, which was done. (See Trans, p. 85 & 
92-94) . 
The equity of the home at the time of the divorce trial 
on September 26, 1988, was zero because of the foreclosure, 
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regardless of a realtor!s statement to the Respondent as 
admitted in her testimony that the fair market value would 
be $65,000.00 and that the Respondent would be lucky if she 
could get that amount out of the home. (See Trans, p. 92). 
The Appellant testified at the time of the trial in Septem-
ber. 1988, in response to a question as to whether the home 
was gone at that time !fitfs history11, and that there may or 
may not be a deficiency. (See Trans, p. 108, 109). The 
Respondent was informed by the Appellant that he felt there 
was no equity in the home upon her demand for $2,000.00 and 
the Appellant refused to take any action in regards to 
listing the home for sale with Brigham Realty or in moving 
back into the home to try to reserve any possible equity. 
(See Trans, p. 92 & 93). 
Charles De Witt, a medical doctor and professor in the 
Department of Pathology at the University of Utah Medical 
Center and Director of the HLA Typing Laboratory for the 
University Medical Center, who was qualified as an expert, 
found that the Appellant from a 1988 test which included a 
total of six separate tests being run showed that the 
probability of paternity for the Appellant for the child, 
Kathy Heyden, with the mother, the Respondent, with a 
probability of paternity at 99%, which is reasonably high. 
(See Trans, p. 16 & Plaintiff's Exhibit #1). 
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In 1979, less extensive paternity tests were run 
through Dr. De Witt which showed an inconclusive, at least 
for evidentiary trial purposes, figure of 89%. (See Trans, 
p. 25 & Plaintiff's Exhibit #3). 
The Appellant's year-to-date earnings to the time of 
trial on September 26, 1988, consisted of $30,925.00, and 
for the pay period ending September 4, 1988, it consisted of 
$1,358.00 over a two-week period, or 84 hours. Two weeks 
later the year-to-date earnings for the Appellant consisted 
of $32,209.86 with a gross for that two-week period of 
$1,283.00 for a total of $2,900.00 gross per month. (See 
Trans, p. 123 & 124 and Defendant's Exhibit #11). 
The Respondent's gross monthly income at $11.40 an hour 
was $1,976.00 with a net take home pay of $1,473.64. (See 
Trans, p. 57 and Plaintiff's Exhibit #2, p. 6). 
The Trial Court entered its Memorandum Decision subse-
quent to the September 26, 1988, trial of the parties on the 
13th day of October, 1988. (See Trial Record p. 108-112 
hereinafter referred to as TR) . The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered on the 
18th day of January, 1989. (See TR p. 117 through 126 and 
p. 129-133). 
A Notice of Appeal on the Decree of Divorce was filed 
by the Appellant on the 15th day of February, 1989. 
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The Memorandum Decision in regards to Respondent's 
Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt for an award of back 
child support was entered on the 3rd day of April, 1989. 
(See TR p. 204), and a Notice of Appeal was taken from that 
order on the 14th day of April, 1989. (See TR p. 206). 
These two appeals were consolidated under an Order of 
Consolidation from this Court on the 14th day of August, 
1989, consolidating Case Number 890142-CA and Case Number 
890224-CA for consolidation purposes to Case Number 
890142-CA. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. This Court will not disturb the findings of the 
Trial Court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion in a 
domestic relations case. 
2. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the blood tests and the testimony of Dr. De Witt 
in light of earlier tests, in determining paternity in the 
Appellant. 
3.The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that there was no equity in the family home. 
4. The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in 
awarding $387.00 per month in child support under the law 
then in effect. 
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5. The Trial Court did have jurisdiction to award 
child support prior to January 18, 1989. 
6. If the Appellant fs appeal is frivolous or for 
delay, Respondent is entitled to damages including reason-
able attorney's fees, and if the judgment is affirmed, 
Respondent is entitled to costs against the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE IS A 
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS CASE. 
The standard for reviewing matters in equity was 
recently considered the the Utah Supreme Court in J & M 
Const., Inc., v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), wherein 
the Court held as follows: 
In reviewing matters in equity, this 
Court will reverse the Trial Court only 
[emphasis added]- when the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the 
findings below. Although we may review 
that evidence, we are particularly 
mindful of the advantage position of the 
Trial Court to hear, weigh, and evaluate 
the testimony of the parties. (Cites 
omitted) Where the evidence may be in 
conflict, this Court will not upset the 
findings below unless the evidence so 
clearly preponderates against them that 
this Court is convinced that a manifest 
injustice has been done... 
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The Court of Appeals of Utah in the recent decision of 
Boyle v, Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) , held as 
follows: 
This Court will refrain from disturbing 
findings of the Trial Court in a divorce 
action unless a clear abuse of dis-
cretion is shown. (Cites omitted) The 
Trial Court is clearly in the best 
position to weigh the evidence, deter-
mine credibility and arrive at factual 
conclusions... 
A review of the facts in this case from the trial 
record and the Memorandum Decision clearly indicate that 
there has been no abuse of discretion nor a manifest injus-
tice and this Court should refrain from disturbing the 
findings of the Trial Court as in this case it was clearly 
in the best position to weigh the evidence, determine 
credibility and arrive at factual conclusions, which it did. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE BLOOD TESTS 
AND THE TESTIMONY OF DR. DE WITT IN 
LIGHT OF EARLIER TESTS. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of Kofford v. Flora, 
744 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987), as cited by the Appellant is the 
authority in the State of Utah in regards to a determination 
of paternity by the admission of HLA blood tests. Kofford 
requires as follows: 
-9-
...Based on the foregoing and other 
authorities, we hold that only probabil-
ities of paternity of 95% or greater 
should be admitted. Furthermore, a 
percentage figure in the range above 95% 
may be translated for the fact finder 
into language that is more meaningful to 
the task at hand, such as "paternity is 
very likely". (Cites omitted) 
When probabilities of paternity in 
a particular case are based, for exam-
ple, on the assumption that the mother 
had more than one consort, in addition 
to the putative father, the probability 
should not be admitted to prove 
paternity unless the statistics have 
similar significance in proving 
paternity. 
In the immediate case at hand, Dr. De Witt specifically 
testified as referred to in the Statement of the Case, that 
the probability of paternity for the Appellant for the 
child, Kathy Heyden, with the mother, the Respondent, that 
the probability of paternity is 99% slightly more and that 
that represents a reasonably high degree of probability. 
Dr. De Witt further testified under both direct and 
cross-examination that the 1979 test included the probabil-
ity of 89% but that that would be inadmissible as evidence 
under the Kofford case cited above because it did not show a 
probability of 95% or greater. The specific reason for the 
difference between the 89% and the 99% was the fact that six 
separate additional tests were run and that the testing is 
now more reliable than that previously done in 1979. 
_i n _ 
In his opening statement, the Appellant's counsel and 
the Court discussed the issue of res judicata in regards to 
bringing up new test scores, Exhibit 4 and the evidence 
submitted from the parties prior Utah case, for which the 
tests were done show a dismissal without prejudice so that 
in fact there has been no adjudication as to the paternity 
of the Appellant for the minor child and a question as to 
whether or not this matter is an issue subject to res 
judicata or collateral estoppel is not even raised as it has 
not been previously litigated. 
Dr. De Witt specifically testified that the 89%, 1979 
test, could not be admissible as being unreliable under the 
Kofford decision but that under the testing done more 
recently in 1988 and the 99% probability factor , Dr. De 
Witt, after having been qualified as an expert by stipu-
lation, felt there was a 99% probability that the Appellant 
was the father of Kathy Heyden. The testimony and evidence 
are in full compliance with the requirements of Kofford, 
supra, running contrary to Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 
1228 (Utah 1980) which is no longer applicable under the 
Kofford standards. 
While the Respondent concedes that the recent Utah Law 
Review article cited in the Appellant's Brief is correct, 
the citation therein does not lend any weight to showing 
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prejudicial error of the Trial Court. The Appellant failed 
to object to the admissibility of the expertise of Dr. De 
Witt, his testimony, and the methodology used in arriving at 
his decision of the 99% probability. 
Additionally, uncontroverted testimony was given by the 
Respondent that she had not had sexual relationship with any 
other parties at the time of conception, negating the 
necessity of other further testimony as to the reliability 
of the high probability of parentage or paternity in the 
Appellant, and testing of other parties. 
While the Appellant is correct in requesting this Court 
to enforce rigid standards and requirements as spelled out 
in Kofford, a thorough review of the record, lack of ob-
jection by the Appellant, lack of other sexual activity 
occurring around the time of conception and the testimony of 
Dr. De Witt fully complies with the strict requirements as 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Kofford v. Flora, and 
this Court should find no abuse of discretion and affirm the 
finding of paternity by the Trial Court. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
EQUITY IN THE FAMILY HOME. 
The parties did purchase a home for $59,900.00 in 
Brigham City, Utah, which was given a fair market value of 
approximately $65,000.00 as testified to by the Respondent 
with the further caviat that the parties would be lucky to 
derive that amount of money from the sale of the home. 
Testimony of the Respondent would further substantiate that 
this fair market value assessment was made around October of 
1987, at the time the Respondent moved from the home after a 
two to three week temporary occupancy of the home which was 
temporarily awarded to the Respondent after the separation 
of the parties in August of 1987. 
This Court in the recent case of Narangjo v. Narangjo, 
751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988), in regards to a judicial 
review of a Trial Court's division of properties in a 
divorce action held as follows: 
There is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of prop-
erties in a divorce action, cites 
omitted, the Trial Court has consider-
able latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity 
(cites omitted). Changes will only be 
made if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against 
the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. (cites omitted). 
Additionally, it is commonly recognized 
by this Court that marital properties 
are valued at the time of the trial. 
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In the immediate case at hand, testimony was offered by 
the Respondent that she moved out of the home in October of 
1987, listed the home for sale, and the home ultimately in 
January or February was foreclosed upon. 
The Trial Judge made a specific findings of fact on 
page 136 of the transcript which can be used to supplement 
the actual findings of fact prepared by counsel under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) and Erwin v. 
Erwin, 108 UAR 55 (May 12, 1989). The transcript in this 
case reads at page 136 "seems to me the testimony was 
somewhat of a offhanded appraisal regardless of whether it 
was $62,000.00 or $65,000.00 -if the house was sold in a 
commercial sale, and there would be at least a 6% or 7% fee 
against that, would reduce it to $60,000.00, There is 
approximately $59,000.00 owing against it. I see if there's 
any equity at all, itfs probably $1,000.00 or less. Even if 
it were valued at $65,000.00. If it were valued at 
$62,000.00, there would be a negative equity. I can't find 
any equity in that property at all, and the fact that there 
was a problem with the Plaintiff in possession and vacating 
the same, doesn't seem to me that it would have been a 
particle of difference as to the division of equity had the 
property still been in the possession of the parties and 
awarded to the Plaintiff or to the Defendant, I would have 
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found no equity to be awarded, I simply would have said you 
can have the property, I find no equity." 
The Trial Court had within its discretion the authority 
to consider the realtor's fees as found in the recent case 
considered by this Court of Asper v. Asper, 753 P. 2d 987 
(Utah App. 1988) wherein this Court found that the Aspers 
had agreed to the value of the home and the equity in it and 
"the deduction of anticipated real estate charges seems to 
be reasonable as each party was charged with half of those 
charges." It further found that in the distribution of 
marital estate, there is no fixed rule or formula... The 
responsibility of the Trial Court is to endeavor to provide 
a just and equitable adjustment of their economic resources 
so that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis. This Court found that the Trial Court in 
Asper had reasonably divided the marital property taking 
into consideration those realty fees. 
Even if this Court were to find that the Trial Court 
had not properly taken into consideration potential real-
tor's fees in finding no equity, the actual value of the 
marital home at the time of the trial could have very well 
been a negative value or a deficiency because of the fore-
closure that had been commenced eight or nine months earli-
er. 
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The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
no equity in the marital home as none existed under one of 
two theories, either the value of the home at the time of 
the trial, or the fact that with the deduction of properly 
considered realty fees there would have been no equity and 
there has been no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court and 
the Trial Court's decision in regards to the equity of the 
marital home should be affirmed. 
POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN AWARDING $38 7.00 PER MONTH 
IN CHILD SUPPORT UNDER THE LAW THEN IN 
EFFECT. 
The Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 prior to its amend-
ment did require a Trial Court to consider at least seven 
factors listed therein in arriving at a child support award 
consisting of: 
(a) The standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) The ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) The need of the obligee; 
(f) The age of the parties; 
(g) The responsibility of the obligor for the support 
of other parties. 
The Trial Court did consider these factors in its 
Memorandum Decision in finding that both parties were 
employed, that the Plaintiff receives an income of approxi-
mately $2,000.00 per month, that the Defendant's income was 
a base pay of $2,594.00 a month, but that his income to date 
of September 4, 1988, had been in the sum of $30,925.88 or 
an average of $3,771.00 per month. The Trial Court further 
found that testimony was also offered that the overtime has 
decreased and is not expected to be at the same level it was 
of the first eight months of the year. The Court then found 
that under the Uniform Child Support Schedule, the child 
support level for one child on the Defendant's base pay 
would be $316.00 per month but under the Appellant's histor-
ical income it would be $458.00 per month." 
The Trial Court then found that "the Appellant also had 
other children, no known child support obligation was shown 
to exist for them, found that should in the future child 
support obligations be assured for those children then 
additional children would be considered for child support 
adjustment." 
Finally, the Trial Court found that the Court was 
unable to conclude based on the evidence whether the income 
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of the Appellant will likely continue at the $3,700,00 per 
month level or the $2,500.00 per month level so that the 
Court will take an average of those based on the Child 
Support Schedule at an amount of $387.00 and that the 
Appellant would be ordered to pay that sum. 
The Trial Court then found that should the Appellant in 
the future be able to assert to the Court that his income 
was not commenserate with the child support level of $387.00 
a month but remained at the base pay of $2,594.80, then he 
could petition the Court for a reduction of the child 
support as provided by law and also that the Plaintiff could 
move to increase the child support should the income contin-
ue at the historical levels. 
The Court did assess the requirements enumerated in 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 and did enter specific find-
ings therein which can be supplemented to the Findings of 
Fact prepared by the parties under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 52(a). 
The Trial Court further granted in its findings and in 
explanation as allowed under the Utah Code Annotated § 
30-3-5 that if at any time due to the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the Trial Court there should be a substantial change 
in circumstances such that the income of the Appellant 
should decrease or increase then due to that continuing 
jurisdiction the Court could modify the award of child 
support. The final award was one as to a discretionary 
decision of the Judge due to the historical earnings of the 
Appellant up to the time of the trial and a question as to 
whether or not those earnings would drop off resulting in a 
figurative splitting of the baby with options open to either 
party to increase or decrease that child support amount in 
the future. 
Appropriate Findings of Fact through the Memorandum 
Decision were found by the Trial Judge in ascertaining the 
award of child support and in taking into consideration Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-45-7.14 which is used as rebuttable 
Child Support Guidelines. 
In regards to the awarding of back child support in the 
paternity action, Utah Code Annotated § 78-45a-3 of the 
Section entitled "Uniform Act on Paternity" specifically 
designates limitation on recovery from the father in a 
paternity action and states: 
The fatherfs liability for past educa-
tion and necessary support are limited 
to a period of four years next proceed-
ing the commencement of an action. 
In the immediate case at hand, in October of 1987 an 
Order to Show Cause was commenced by the Plain-
tiff/Respondent for recovery of child support which was left 
open to a future determination of paternity and the original 
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action was filed in August of 1987 such that an award of 
child support back to that date would be in compliance with 
the Utah Code Annotated § 78-45a-3. 
Based on the above and foregoing, the Trial Court did 
not commit reversible error in awarding $387.00 per month in 
child support but did properly consider the feictors enu-
merated in the Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 in arriving at 
a halfway mark between the evidence actually presented and 
the possibility of a reduced amount of income in the future 
with an unnecessary but obvious note by the Trial Judge that 
either party under the continuing jurisdiction of the Trial 
Court could petition the Court for a modification for either 
an increase or decrease depending on future events, all 
which is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
AWARD CHILD SUPPORT PRIOR TO JANUARY 18, 
1989. 
Appellant's Point IV essentially addresses two differ-
ent issues, although not quite understandable by Respondent. 
Issue one would deal with whether or not the Trial Court has 
jurisdiction to either enforce or modify the Decree of 
Divorce and Issue two would seem to revolve around whether 
or not the Trial Court can backdate or award child support 
retroactive before the January 18, 1989, Decree of Divorce 
entry. 
In regards to Issue number one, Peters v. Peters, 394 
P. 2d 71 (Utah 1964) does indicate that upon appeal further 
jurisdiction as to the issues of, in particular here support 
money, are no longer vested in the Trial Court, This would 
deal with modification issues which is exactly what the 
Appellant in this case attempted to do in response to the 
Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt by the Respondent. The 
Trial Court found at the Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt 
hearing that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the 
Judgment but that pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated § 
30-3-5 it did have authority to award on-going child support 
and to enforce the support Order previously awarded through 
the Decree of Divorce and its Memorandum Decision of October 
13, 1988. 
In particular, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984) held that a 
District Court's "Memorandum Decision" was susceptible of 
enforcement as a final judgment appealable to the Supreme 
Court notwithstanding that it was not designated as a 
"Order" or a "Judgment". 
In the immediate case at hand, the Memorandum Decision 
in regards to the child support and back child support was 
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entered by the Trial Court on October 13, 1988, and was 
fully enforceable. 
The Memorandum Decision and Decree of Divorce as well 
as any judgment even though on appeal, are still enforceable 
unless the party seeking non-enforcement has posted a 
supersedeas bond. 
Unless the Appellant has filed a supersedeas bond to 
stay enforcement of the judgment, the Trial Court still has 
jurisdiction to enforce judgment and collection which is 
what the Respondent did under the Order to Show Cause and 
was eventually awarded correctly back child support. 
Additionally, in Peters v. Peters, 394 P. 2d 71 (Utah 
1964) at page 73, the Supreme Court found as follows: 
...Until the Plaintiff refused to pay 
the $2,500.00 and took the appeal, the 
Defendant could not have petitioned for 
the allowances of which the Plaintiff 
complains upon the basis set forth 
because the circumstances giving rise to 
the need did not exist until then. Her 
petition stating those facts invoked the 
jurisdiction of the Court in a new and 
supplemental proceeding in which it was 
authorized to make such further orders 
as it deemed reasonable, equitable and 
just under the circumstances. 
In regards to Issue two and the Trial Court's authority 
to award retroactive child support or to award child support 
that the Appellant could be responsible for, that would be 
owing prior to the signing of the Decree on January 18, 
1989, the Utah legislature in 1965 enacted Utah Code 
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Annotated § 78-45a-3 entitled "Limitation on Recovery from 
the Father" states as follows: 
The father's liability for past educa-
tion, necessary support are limited to a 
period of four years next preceding the 
commencement of an action. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Respondent filed her 
Complaint for divorce and for a determination of paternity 
in August of 1987 at the time that the minor child was 
approximately 11 years of age, which would have entitled the 
Respondent to necessary support for a period of four years 
next preceding the commencement of the action or back to 
1983, giving the Trial Court full discretion to award child 
support back to that time period when in fact the actual 
back child support award was only back dated to August of 
1987 at the time the Respondent commenced the action. 
Based on the above and foregoing statutes and case law, 
the Trial Court had jursidiction to award child support 
prior to January 18, 1989, even as far back as August, 1983, 
and maintains jurisdiction to enforce any child support 
arrearage and on-going child support, although no jurisdic-
tion exists as to a modification until the appeal is decid-
ed. 
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POINT VI. 
IF THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
OR FOR DELAY, RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, AND IF THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED, 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT. 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 33, 
'DAMAGES FOR DELAY OR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL" states as 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous 
appeal. If the Court determines a 
motion made or an appeal taken under 
these Rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
Should the Court determine that the Appellant's appeal is 
either frivolous or for delay, it should award just damages 
and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, to the Respondent. 
Rule 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
entitled "A AWARD OF COSTS", states: 
(a) To whom or allowed. Except as 
otherwise provided by law, if an appeal 
is dismissed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties or ordered by the 
Court; if a judgment order is affirmed, 
costs shall be taxed against the appel-
lant unless otherwise ordered. 
The 
entitled 
follows: 
^ A 
Should Appellant's appeal be denied and Respondent's 
judgment affirmed, costs should be taxed against the Appel-
lant unless otherwise ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was clearly in the best position to 
weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at 
factual conclusions in this case, which it did, and there is 
no clear abuse of discretion in that it acted correctly in 
doing so. 
Further, based on the requirements as outlined in the 
Kofford case and the testimony of Dr. De Witt, the issue of 
paternity in the Appellant was correctly determined and here 
again the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. 
Based on evidence and testimony concerning the equity, 
or lack thereof, in the family home, the Trial Court was 
correct in its findings that there was no equity or even the 
possibility of a negative equity based on the fact that the 
the home had been forclosed upon. 
The Trial Court used proper discretion in the awarding 
of child support based on the standards in existence at the 
time of the trial and further stating that either party 
could petition the Court for a modification if there was a 
substantial increase or decrease in income and/or other 
determining factors. 
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The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in that it 
did have jurisdiction over this matter based on the various 
Memorandum Decisions and statutes of the State of Utah. 
The Respondent should further be awarded her attorney's 
fees and costs-, and such other relief as the Court deems 
proper in that the Appellant's appeal would seem to be one 
of a frivolous nature and/or for delay in concluding of this 
matter. 
Finally, this Court should affirm the decision of the 
Trial Court in full based on the above and foregoing facts 
presented herein in that it clearly did not abuse its 
discretionary powers.-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jC^ IIZLT day of November, 
1989. 
Attorney for / 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. HURT ] 
Plaintiff ] 
VS ] 
FRANCIS 0. HURT JR. , ] 
Defendant ] 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
> CASE NO. 870030225 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion and 
Petition to Reduce Child Support. Neither the motion nor the 
response thereto is accompanied with an affidavit. The Petition 
simply requests this Court to reduce the child support from 
$387.00 per month to the sum of $332.00 per month on the basis 
that the Defendant is not receiving nor will receive in the future 
the over-time he did in the past and that the Court should not 
consider over-time in calculating Defendant's income* 
This Court considered the historical income of the 
Defendant and set the child support at $387.00 per month. If in 
fact his income this year has substantially changed, then perhaps 
affidavits to that effect should be filed with the Court. Based 
upon what the Court has before it at this time, the Defendant's 
historical income justifies the amount ordered for as and for 
child support. If in fact the Defendant's income has decreased as 
alleged and will continue at a decreased level, the Defendant is 
correct and the Court should reduce the amount of child support 
ordered. This Court does not have before it sufficient 
information to justify a modification of the decree. Further, it 
appears that this matter is on appeal and a further modification 
of the decree may not be in order. Counsel for the Plaintiff is 
directed to prepare a formal order in compliance herewith. 
Dated this 3rd day of April 1989. 
Judge, Gordon J. Low 
First District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of April 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, postage prepaid, to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Dale M, 
Dorius, Attorney for the Defendant, P.O. Box "U", 29 South Main 
Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302 
ItfChritfineMorriso" 
Christine Morrison 
Deputy Court Clerk 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
Lega l Forum B u i l d i n g 
2447 K i e s e l Avenue 
Ogden, U tah 8 4 4 0 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 6 2 1 - 2 4 6 4 
IN THE FIRST JUDIC IAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. HURT, / 
P l a i n t i f f , / DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v s . / 
FRANCIS 0 . HURT, J R . , / C i v i l No. 870030225 
D e f e n d a n t . / 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
16th day of September, 1988, before the Honorable Gordon J. 
Low, one1 of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
with her attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appear-
ing in person and with his attorney, Dale M. Don* us, and 
each of the parties.having been sworn and testifying in 
their own behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, 
Dr. DeWitt having been called as a witness and testimony 
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having been given, and the Court having taken said matter 
under advisement and having rendered his Memorandum Decision 
in writing, and the Court being fully cognizant of all 
matters pertaining therein, and having made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writing, 
NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff, Cindy A. Hurt, is granted a 
Decree of Divorce from Francis 0. Hurt, Jr., said divorce to 
become final upon the signing and entry. 
2. That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child, Kathy Jo Hurt, born February 12. 
1976, subject to the Defendant's right to visit as allocated 
by the Division of Family Services and/or the Adult Proba-
tion and Parole. 
3. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plain-
tiff the sum of $387.00 per month as and for support, based 
on an average between the Defendant's base income of 
$2,594.00 and his historical income of $3,771.00 per month; 
should Defendant in the future be able to assert to the 
Court that his income- has not been commensurate with that 
child support level, but rather remains at the base pay of 
$2,594.80, then he may petition the Court for a reduction of 
the same as provided by law. 
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4. That if the Defendant becomes obligated to pay 
support for the two (2) children he claims he has in the 
future, then additional support for these children should be 
considered for child- support adjustment and the Defendant 
may petition the Court for a modification of the Decree as 
to child support. 
5. That should the Defendant's income remain at the 
historical income, then the Plaintiff shall also have the 
right to petition the Court for an increase in child sup-
port . 
6. That the Plaintiff is granted a .Judgment of delin-
quent support from August, 1987 through September 30, 1983 
in the sun of $5,496.00. 
7. That the Defendant is entitled to an offset of 
$2,000.00 for debts the Defendant has paid to date, plus 
another offset of $3,500.00 for debts still remaining un-
paid, said sums to be subtracted from the delinquent child 
support and gives the Defendant a credit of $4.00 towards 
the support. 
8. Defendant is obligated to assume and discharge all 
of the marital debts incurred in the marriage, and the 
Plaintiff is obliqated to pay First Security Bank of approx-
imately $1,900.00, Norwest Finance of $2,261.00, Mastercard 
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First Security Bank of $780.00, Peoples First Thrift of 
$1,100.00 and Attorney Wynn E. Bartholomew of $1,000.00, and 
that the Defendant shall assume and discharge all other 
debts, holding the Plaintiff harmless from same with the 
offsets. 
9. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment of $277.00 
for the HL-A and $152.50 for the expert testimony of Dr. 
DeWitt and costs, for a total Judgment of $429.50. 
10. That the Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered 
to maintain their health and accident insurance on the minor 
child so long as it is available through their place of 
employment, with the Defendant being the primary provider 
and the Plaintiff the secondary provider, provided however 
that each of the parties are responsible for one-half [k) of 
all medical and dental expenses incurred by the ninor child 
not covered by both insurance policies. 
11. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain his 
present life insurance naming the child as a beneficiary, 
provided however that other children of the Defendant may 
also be named as co-insurers and co-beneficiaries on an 
equal basi s. 
12. That neither party is awarded any alimony. 
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13. That if there is a deficiency on the family home, 
then each of the parties are ordered to assume and pay 
one-half {%) of the deficiency. 
14. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
personal belongings and effects and automobiles presently 
they each now have in their respective custody and control. 
15. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
savings bonds that they have accumulated since the filing of 
the divorce and is not considered marital assets. 
16. That each of the parties are ordered to assume and 
pay their own attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this /p<L day of January, 1989. 
/s/ Gor^o^ : LOVV 
G O R D O N J . L O W , 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DM.E M. DORIUS, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. HURT, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
FRANCIS 0. HURT, 
Defendant 
Jr., 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1
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This matter came on before the Court for trial on the 26th 
day of September, 19 8 8 with both parties and their respective 
counsel appearing. The Court having heard testimony and received 
evidence, has made certain findings and issues the followiwg 
Memorandum Decision. 
1. Divorce 
Plaintiff is granted a Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
against the Defendant, the same to become final upon entry and 
based upon the grounds of irreconciable differences. 
2. Child Support 
Defendant is the father of the minor child in question and 
is obligated to provide child support for said child. Both parties 
are employed. The Plaintiff receives an income of approximately 
$2,000.00 per month. The Defendants income on base pay is 
$2,594.00. His income however to date of September 4, 1988, has 
been in the sura of $30,925.88 or an average of $3,771.00 per month. 
Hurt v. Hurt 
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There is testimony also that the overtime has decreased and is 
not expected to be of the same level it has of the first eight 
months of this year. Under the Uniform Child Support Schedule, 
the child support level for one child on defendant's base pay would 
be $316.00 per month. Under his historical income it would be 
#45 8.0 0 per month. 
The Defendant also has other children though no child support 
obligation was shown to exist for the same. Should in the future 
child support obligations be assured for those other children, then 
additional children should be considered for child support adjustmeni 
The Court being unable to conclude, based on the evidence, 
whether the income of the Defendant will likely continue at the 
$3,700.00 per month level or the $2,500.00 level, the Court will tak 
an average of the same at $387.00 and the Defendant will be ordered 
to pay said sum. Should he in the future be able to assert to the 
Court that his income has not been commensurate with that child 
support level, bur rather remains at the base pay of $2,59 4.80 then 
he may petition the Court for a reduction of the same as provided b; 
law. The Plaintiff may also move to increase the same should his 
income continue at the historical levels. 
3. Back Child Support 
With respect to back child support the Court finds that 
during the period between the filing of this action, August 1987, 
and the present the Defendant's income was $3,70 0.00 per month and 
child support therefore should be based upon the $458.00 sum resul 
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in unpaid child support obligation from the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $5,496.00. 
4. Debts and Obligations: 
With respect to the debts and obligations, most of those 
incurred by the plaintiff were incurred subsequent to the separation, 
most of those carried by the defendant were incurred during the 
marriage against which he has paid approximately $7,000.00. Since 
his income has been almost double that of the Plaintiff it would 
only be reasonable that the responsibility for those debts and 
obligations would be double hers. Additionally, some of the debts 
that he has paid on have been debts incurred subsequent to the 
separation. The Court therefore finds that of the $6,/32.00 which 
he has paid during the separation, $2,000.00 of the same will be 
the responsibility of the Plaintiff and the sum for back child 
support of $5,496.00 shall be reduced by the sum of $2,000.00. 
Plaintiff is also awarded judgment against the Defendant in the sum 
of $277.00 for the costs of expert testimony (Dr. Dewitt); $152.50 
costs; and, a Withholding Order shall issue with respect to child 
support. 
5. Insurance 
Both parties are ordered to maintain Health and Accident 
Insurance on the child as available through their place of employment 
with the Defendant being the primary provider and the Plaintiff 
being the secondary provider. Life Insurance to be continued with 
the child as the beneficiary. Other children of the Defendant may 
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may also be named as co-insurers and co-beneficiaries on an 
equal basis. 
6. Alimony 
No alimony is awarded. It would appear that both parties 
are equally able to bear their own costs and attorney fees and 
therefore no attorney fees are awarded. The Findings are to reflect 
the income of the two parties and the Court as stated from the 
bench finds no loss of equity in the home. 
With respect to debts and obligations should there be any 
deficiency on the home, the parties are equally libel therefore. 
From the testimony of the parties it would appear that there is 
approximately $14,000.00 due and owing, some of which was incurred 
by the Defendant himself. The bulk however was incurred during 
the course of the marriage. Of that, approximately $3,000.00 was 
used by the Defendant, some of which was for personal property now 
awarded to the Plaintiff and some to the Defendant. Of the approxim 
$10,000.00 remaining in debts incurred during the marriage and 
apparently used for essentially household expenses, and given the 
respective income of the two parties it would appear that $6,500.00 
of the same should be payable by the Defendant and $3,500.00 by the 
Plaintiff. The sum of $3,500.00 is then to be furrher reduced from 
the amount of back child support owed by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff. The property co be awarded as now in possession except 
as so stipulated in Court. 
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All other matters are as stated from the bench. Counsel 
for Plaintiff to prepare the formal order and findings. 
Lis Dated thi  1^ day of October, 19 88. 
District Judge 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. HURT ] 
Plaintiff ] 
vs ; 
FRANCIS 0. HURT JR., ] 
Defendant ] 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) CASE NO. 870030225 
This matter came on before the Court upon the 6th day of 
March 1989 upon the Plaintiff's order to show cause, requesting 
this Court to enter a judgment for unpaid child support from 
October 1, 1989 through March 1, 1989, in the amount of $387.00 
per month for a total of $2322.00 The Defendant argues that the 
Court is without jurisdiction relative to amount of child support 
ordered under the decree, and has lost jurisdiction by reason of 
the appeal. 
In order to avoid hardship to the children, the Court does 
have power to award a temporary order of child support and 
maintenance. Whether that be the case or otherwise, the Court 
orders the sum of $387.00 per month to be paid on a continuing 
basis during the pendency of this appeal, and a judgment may be 
entered for the sum as prayed as and for on-going support. 
Dated this 3rd day of April 1988. 
Number^  
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of April 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, postage prepaid, to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Dale M. 
Dorius, Attorney for the Defendant, P.O. Box U, 29 South Main 
Street, Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
ft/ Christine Morrison 
Christine Morrison 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Tele: 621-2464 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY HURT, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANCIS 0. HURT, JR., ] 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE. 
I Civil No: 870030225 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
6th day of March, 19 89, before the Honorable GORDON J. LOW, one 
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, 
on the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt and for 
payment of continuing child support and for a Judgment on the 
arrearage, and on the Defendants Affidavit to Modify the Divorce 
Decree, and the Court having made and entered an Order subject to 
the parties filing briefs, and said briefs having been filed by 
both parties and the Court having rendered its two (2) written 
Memorandum Decisions, and the Court being fully cognizant of all 
matters pertaining therein, enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment as and for 
delinquent support through March 1, 1989, in the sum of $2,322.00 
-1-
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and that the month of April, 1989 is not included. 
2. That Defendant is ordered to continue making his 
child support in the sum of $387.00 per month, as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
3. That the Court in order to avoid hardship to the 
children, does have the power to award a temporary order of 
child support and maintenance and does so. 
4. That Plaintiff is granted a Judgment for $250.00 
attorney fees, plus $53.50 costs. 
5. That the Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce as to child support is denied in that Court does not 
have sufficient information to justify a modification of the 
Decree. Further, since the Defendant has appealed uhis matter 
in the Supreme Court, that a further modification of the Decree 
may not be in order in that the Court may not have jurisdiction 
to modify the Divorce Decree. 
6. That Plaintiff's counsel has directed and ordered 
to prepare an Order in accordance with the Judge's Memorandum 
Decisions. 
DATED this day of ^ pjs^T, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
JS/ IS/ GORDON J, Low 
Honorable GORDON J. LOW, 
Judge of District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box U 
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Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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1989, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
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U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Dale M. Dorius 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
P.O. Box U 
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Brigham City, Utah 84302 
